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We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every
competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by a package of anonymous
commodity taxes that causes prices to adjust and markets to reclear at
diﬀerent levels of individual consumption. This constrained suboptimality
of competitive allocations might provide a rationale for economic policy in
economies with externalities. It shows that policy makers should look for
good tax packages that help everybody, rather than thinking taxes must
inevitably be bad for some lobby that will oppose them.
Key words: externalities, commodity taxes, constrained suboptimality.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: D50, D60, D62, D82.1 Introduction
It is a curious fact that most policy makers regard taxes as bad, while at the
same time they recognize the existence of widespread externalities. In this
paper we try to make the case that there is almost always a tax package that
is good for everybody.
The classical theorems of welfare economics, formulated deﬁnitively in
Arrow (1951) and Debreu (1951), established the equivalence between com-
petitive equilibrium allocations and Pareto optimal allocations in economies
without externalities. When there are externalities, private costs and social
costs diﬀer, and competitive equilibria are not likely to be Pareto eﬃcient.
Agents will typically make poor social choices, for example, smoking too
much or driving too much, because they do not take into account the cost
they impose on bystanders who must inhale their smoke or exhaust fumes,
not to mention getting crowded out of highway space. Lindahl (1919) and
Pigou (1920, 1932) famously argued that taxes could be an appropriate anti-
dote to the socially false incentives provided by competitive prices, because
if the taxes were set equal to the external cost imposed on third parties,
then agents would eﬀectively internalize the externality, taking into account
the cost they imposed on others. Despite general familiarity with Pigouvian
taxation, policy makers have not embraced the concept of “good taxes”. We
believe there are at least three reasons.
In the ﬁr s tp l a c e ,a n yo n et a xh u r t ss o m ep e o p l ew h i l eh e l p i n go t h e r s .
The bystander does not have to breathe as much noxious air, but the smoker
must pay a tax and not enjoy as many cigarettes. Unless one is prepared
to make interpersonal utility comparisons, valuing bystanders’ utilities more
than smokers’ utilities, the Pigouvian observation about divergent private
and social costs is not an argument by itself for taxation.
Second, if Pigouvian taxation is taken to its logical conclusion, then diﬀer-
ent individuals should face diﬀerent tax rates for the same good. (A smoker
who always lights up outdoors should pay less tax than his brother who only
smokes in crowded restaurants, because he causes less damage.) This idea
was elaborated in Lindahl (1919, 1928), Samuelson (1954), Coase (1960),
and Arrow (1970). In “Lindahl equilibrium”, Pareto eﬃciency is achieved
by charging diﬀerent taxes for the same good, depending on the buyer. Fur-
thermore, combining these individual speciﬁc taxes with a carefully chosen
program of individually targeted income redistribution (often exceeding the
revenue raised by the taxes) can achieve allocations that Pareto dominate
1purely competitive equilibrium. But such detailed, and discriminatory, in-
terventions seem hopelessly complicated, and possibly illegal.
Third, even if it were practical to implement a plan that taxed commodity
purchases and redistributed income on a person speciﬁcb a s i s ,h o ww o u l dt h e
tax authorities ever know which individuals to charge the higher taxes? As
Arrow (1970) pointed out, Lindahl equilibrium does not satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraints of Hurwicz (1972), since it is not in the interest of
individuals to reveal the information necessary for the price mechanism to
function.
In this paper we suppose that the social planner can discover the pop-
ulation distribution of household types (say a continuum of each of I>1
types of households, where a type deﬁnes an agent’s preferences, endow-
ments, and the externalities his consumption generates). The planner does
not need to know which agent is of which type. We also suppose there are
more commodities L than household types, L>I . We then show that for
almost all externalities, there is a way to make everybody better oﬀ than
they would be under perfect competition by taxing or subsidizing commodi-
ties anonymously (everyone pays the same tax) and redistributing the tax
revenue anonymously (each household gets the same rebate, independent of
their income or how much they spent or what taxes they paid). It is not nec-
essary to make interpersonal utility comparisons to see that this tax package
is better than laissez faire, taxes do not need to be individual speciﬁc, and
the central planner needs to know about population characteristics and not
about individuals.
Techniques of diﬀerential topology became standard in general equilib-
rium theory after the pioneering work of Debreu (1970, 1972, 1976). Our
proof of generic Pareto improving taxes introduces these techniques into pub-
lic ﬁnance, where, though natural, they have been seldom applied. Guesnerie
(1977) did provide suﬃcient conditions on the externalities, prices, excess de-
mands, and the derivatives of demand at equilibrium for tax interventions to
P a r e t oi m p r o v eo v e rt h es t a t u sq u o .B u th ed i dn o tc o n n e c tt h e s et op r i m -
itives on preferences and endowments, as we do by showing that they occur
at every equilibrium for almost all preferences, endowments, and separable
externalities.
Our theorem, on the other hand, does not address several important
questions. It does not say how big the taxes could be, and thus how much
revenue they could generate, and still Pareto improve on laissez faire. Taxes
in modern economies are quite high, and have potentially large incentive
2eﬀects. One message of our theorem is that it might be useful to consider
how much of this revenue could be raised through a package of "good taxes"
that raise welfare instead of simple income taxes that might discourage work.
The theorem compares welfare at competitive equilibrium (with no taxes)
to equilibrium after the “good tax package” has been implemented. It does
not examine whether starting from a situation with an income tax, it is
always possible to ﬁnd a tax package raising the same revenue but making
everyone better oﬀ.
The theorem considers only separable externalities, which do not aﬀect
any agent’s marginal rate of substitution between goods. Moreover, the theo-
rem is proven for almost all externalities. It is possible that a deeper analysis
might show that for any nontrivial (separable or nonseparable) externality,
some tax package could be found to Pareto improve on competitive equilib-
rium. Economies that allow for strategic interactions generalize economies
with externalities. It would then be an immediate extension of the deeper
argument to show that, with strategic interactions, generically, there are
commodity taxes that lead to Pareto improvement in welfare.
Our theorem also does not suggest how the social planner might come
to know the distribution of agent types in the population. But that is a far
smaller information burden than knowing the type of every individual.
The demonstration that competitive equilibria in economies with ex-
ternalities are constrained suboptimal makes an important methodological
point. Tax intervention is often said to be counterproductive because com-
petitive equilibrium cannot be Pareto improved by anonymous taxes. Since
externalities are ubiquitous, our theorem shows that such a view is unten-
able. Tax intervention may be counterproductive because the ﬁscal authority
does not know enough about the population distribution of tastes and en-
dowments to set the right taxes and subsidies, but not because there are no
beneﬁcial taxes and subsidies. The argument shows that such taxes exist; it
does not indicate how to compute them.
An alternative approach would be to ask which allocations can be im-
plemented as strategic equilibria, through the design of mechanisms and an
explicit recognition of incentive compatibility constraints, as introduced by
Hurwicz (1973, 1979) or, in an abstract setting, by Maskin (1999) and de-
veloped in the theory of contracts. We have eschewed this approach in order
to focus on the functioning of competitive, anonymous markets. We have
in eﬀect severely constrained the kinds of interventions that a policy maker
could use, and yet we still prove the existence of Pareto improving taxes.
3Work in public ﬁnance, starting with Ramsey (1927), and developed in
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Diamond (1975) characterized second-
best commodity taxes in the the absence of lump-sum transfers. Corrective
uniform taxation was considered for simple economies in Diamond (1973).
While our question of the existence of Pareto improving taxes, constrained
to be anonymous, does not seem to have been posed in precisely our form
for externalities, the analogous question when externalities are replaced by
incomplete asset markets or asymmetric information has been analyzed re-
peatedly.
With uncertainty and an incomplete asset market, Geanakoplos and Pole-
marchakis (1986) proved the constrained suboptimality of competitive equi-
librium allocations: generically, there is a reallocation of assets that leads to
a Pareto superior allocation of goods after prices in commodity spot markets
adjust and markets clear. This phenomenon had been illustrated (but not
proved) in Stiglitz (1982), while Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998) reﬁned
the proof. Citanna, Polemarchakis and Tirelli (2006) showed that taxation,
which is anonymous, could induce a Pareto improving reallocation of assets.
The Pareto improving possibilities generated by the taxation of exchanges
in economies with asymmetric information was introduced by Greenwald
and Stiglitz (1986). Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1997), and later Bisin,
Geanakoplos, Gottardi, Minelli and Polemarchakis (2002), showed that many
adverse selection and moral hazard problems, including the adverse selection
problem described in Akerlof (1970) or Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), and
the moral hazard phenomena described in Mirrlees (1977), could be recast in
a more standard general equilibrium context with two changes: promises by
diﬀerent agents are pooled together, and the deliveries each agent makes are
an option for him. Bisin, Geanakoplos, Gottardi, Minelli and Polemarchakis
(2002) showed that, generically, the anonymous taxation of these contracts
can eﬀect a Pareto improvement.
In this prior work on constrained ineﬃciency it was possible to confront
directly the question of how the central planner could discover enough about
the characteristics of the agents to ﬁnd the right tax rates. Even when the as-
set market is incomplete, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1990) showed that
the utility function of an individual can be identiﬁed from his demand func-
tion for commodities and assets; recently, Kubler, Chiappori, Ekeland and
Polemarchakis (2002) extended the argument to show that every individual
utility can be obtained from aggregate demand or the graph of the equilib-
rium correspondence as the allocation of endowments varies. For economies
4with a public good, Snyder (1999) obtained results concerning restrictions on
the market behavior of optimizing individuals, but Carvajal (2002) showed
t h a tt h er e s u l t sd on o tg e n e r a l i z e .
Unfortunately the separable externalities we assume in this paper do not
have observable consequences for agent demands, so we must leave open the
question of how the central planner could discover the size of the externalities
one man’s consumption inﬂicts on others.
2T h e e c o n o m y
Household types are represented by individuals i ∈ I = {1,...,I}, and
commodities by   ∈ L = {1,...,L}. We imagine a continuum of individuals
of each type i.
For any individual i ∈ I, we denote a non-negative consumption bundle




+; across individuals, we denote an allocation
of commodities by   x =( x1,...,x i,...,xI) ∈ RLI
+ . When we wish to emphasize
the consumption of some individual i ,w ew r i t e  x =( xi,x −i), where x−i =
(xh : h =1 ,...,I,h6= i) is the complementary allocation.
An individual is described by his utility function and endowment. His
utility function ui : RLI
+ → R has domain the set of allocations. The depen-
dence of ui on x−i is what we mean by an externality, since in competitive
equilibrium individual i has no control over x−i and yet his utility depends
on it. His endowment is a vector of goods ei ∈ RL
++, a consumption bundle.
Across individuals, the proﬁle of utility functions is   u =( u1,...,u i,...,
uI), and the allocation of endowments is   e =( e1 ...,e i,...,e I). The pair
(  u,  e) deﬁnes an economy.
The aggregate endowment is e =
P
i ei. At an allocation, aggregate con-
sumption is x =
P
i xi, and the allocation is feasible if x = e.
The proﬁle of utilities at an allocation is   u(  x)=( u1(  x),...,u i(  x),. . . ,
uI(  x)). An allocation,   x1, is Pareto superior to another,   x2, if   u(  x1) >  u(  x2);
a feasible allocation is Pareto optimal if a Pareto superior feasible allocation
does not exist.
Prices of commodities are denoted by p =( p1,...,p l,...p L) ∈ RL
+, and
commodity tax rates by (t1,...,t l,...t L) ∈ RL; prices are positive, but tax
rates may be negative – tl < 0 is a subsidy. We shall always regard a tax
as levied on the buyers, so that a commodity with price p  and tax rate t 
costs any buyer p +t , but brings revenue of only p  to the seller. Lump-sum
5transfers of revenue are determined by a single scalar τ ∈ R representing the
transfer to each individual. The transfer can be positive or negative. Taxes
and transfers are anonymous.
An individual regards the transfer of revenue that he receives as indepen-
dent of the commodity taxes that he pays.
At prices p and tax rates t and revenue τ and complementary allocation





s.t( p + t) · (x − ei)+ − p · (x − ei)− ≤ τ
The solution to the optimization problem is xi(p,t,τ,x−i,e i).
G i v e na ne c o n o m y(  u,  e) and tax rates t, a competitive t -equilibrium con-
sists of prices and a feasible allocation, (p,  x), such that xi ∈ xi(p,t,τ,x−i,e i),
where τ =( 1 /I)
P
i t · (xi − ei)+ is the per capita share of the tax revenue P
i t · (xi − ei)+.
A competitive equilibrium is a competitive t-equilibrium at tax rates t =
0.
A feasible allocation is constrained Pareto suboptimal if there exists a tax
package t and a Pareto superior competitive t-equilibrium allocation.
The purpose of the paper is to prove the following theorem, whose terms
will be made formally precise in the next sections.
Theorem For almost all economies with separable externalities and L>I,
every competitive equilibrium is constrained Pareto suboptimal; that is, for
each competitive equilibrium, there exists an anonymous tax package t and a
competitive t-equilibrium allocation which Pareto dominates it.
3 Walrasian equilibria
An economy is Walrasian if there are no external eﬀects: for every individual,
the utility function, ui, is independent of the complementary allocation, x−i,
and there are no taxes or transfers: t =0and τ =0 . For such economies it
is notationally easier to take the domain of ui to be simply RL
+.
A Walrasian economy is smooth if, for every individual i ∈ I,
1. the utility function, ui, is continuous, strictly monotonically increasing
and strictly quasi-concave;
62. in the interior of its domain of deﬁnition, the utility function is twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, diﬀerentiably strictly monotonically incre-
asing: Dui À 0, and diﬀerentiably strictly quasi concave: y0Dui =0⇒
y0(Dui)y<0, for y 6=0 ;along any sequence (xi
n : n =1 ,...), with
limn→∞ xi




n =0 . In particular, if x> >0 and ui(y) ≥
ui(x), then y> >0.
3. the endowment is strictly positive: ei À 0.
From now on we ﬁx L>I>1, and   u∗ =( u∗1,...,u∗i,...,u∗I) satisfying
1−2 above. The set of economies, E, is then parameterized by the allocation
of endowments,   e; E = RLI
++ is an open set in Euclidean space of dimension
LI. A property holds for "almost all" economies or "generically" if it holds
for an open set E0 ⊂ E of economies whose complement E\E
0 has Lebesgue
measure zero. We call the set E0 generic or say it has full Lebesgue measure.
We now quickly review the main properties of competitive equilibrium
for Walrasian economies. These were established by Debreu in 1970.
With no taxes or income transfers or externalities, the optimization prob-





s.t p · (xi − ei) ≤ 0.
The solution to the optimization problem of the individual exists and
is unique, and is denoted by xi(p,ei). From our assumptions 1-3 we know
that xi(p,ei) >> 0 whenever p> >0. The excess demand function of the
individual, zi, is deﬁned by zi(p,ei)=xi(p,ei) − ei.
The individual excess demand function is continuously diﬀerentiable, and
it satisﬁes homogeneity of degree 0 in prices: zi(kp,ei)=zi(p,ei), for k>0,
and Walras’ law: p · zi(p,ei)=0 ;also, along any sequence (pn : n =1 ,...),
with limn→∞ = p on the boundary of the strictly positive domain, limn→∞ =
kzi(pn,e i)k = ∞.1
A Walrasian equilibrium consists of prices and a feasible allocation, (p,  x),
such that xi ∈ xi(p,ei), for every individual.
Since the utility functions of individuals are strictly monotonically in-
creasing, it is suﬃcient to restrict attention to strictly positive prices: p À 0.
1Debreu (1972, 1976).
7By homogeneity it also suﬃces to restrict attention to equilibrium prices
p =( p1,...,p L−1,1) for which commodity l = L is numéraire.
The aggregate excess demand function, z, is deﬁned by z(p,  e)=
P
i zi(p,
ei); it inherits the continuous diﬀerentiability of the excess demand functions
of individuals, and it satisﬁes homogeneity of degree 0 and Walras’ law;
along any sequence (pn : n =1 ,...), with limn→∞ = p on the boundary of
the strictly positive domain, limn→∞ = kz(pn,  e)k = ∞.
The truncated excess demand of an individual is ˆ zi =( zi
1,...,zi
L−1); it
is the demand for commodities other than the numéraire. Similarly, the
truncated excess demand for the economy is ˆ z =( z1,...,z L−1).
For an economy,   e, we write ˆ z  e(p)=ˆ z(p,  e). Walrasian equilibrium prices
satisfy ˆ z  e(p)=0 . Conversely, by Walras Law, any price vector p satisfying
ˆ z  e(p)=0is part of a Walrasian equilibrium.
An equilibrium (p,  x) for the economy   e is called regular if dim[Dˆ z  e(p)] =
L−1. By the implicit function theorem, a regular equilibrium is locally unique
and varies smoothly as the endowment varies on a small open set around   e.
The economy   e itself is called regular if all its equilibria are regular, that is,
if ˆ z  e(p)=0 ⇒ dim[Dˆ z  e(p)] = L − 1. We sometimes denote this situation
by ˆ z  e t 0.
Let K ⊂ E = RLI
++ be a compact set of endowment vectors. The set of
equilibria (p,  x) corresponding to endowments   e ∈ K must be compact. It is
obviously closed. To see that it lies in a bounded set, note ﬁr s tt h a tt h e r e
is some ¯ e> >
P
i  ei for all   e ∈ K. Hence in any equilibrium, all individual
consumptions lie in the compact set 0 ≤ xi ≤ ¯ e. Furthermore, the minimum
of the continuous function u∗1 on K must be attained at some ¯ x1 >> 0.
Thus we can further conclude that any equilibrium consumption x1must sat-
isfy u1(x1) ≥ u1(¯ x1). From assumption 2 that means x1 >> 0. From this
interiority and the ﬁrst order conditions in the above optimization problem,
we deduce that equilibrium prices must be p = Du∗1(x1)/(∂u∗1(x1)/∂xL) for
some x1 satisfying the aforementioned inequalities. Since u∗1 is continuously
diﬀerentiable and since x1 must lie in a compact set, so must the prices p.
It follows that the set of Walrasian equilibria for a single regular economy
is ﬁnite.2
A theorem of Arrow and Debreu (1954) assures us that equilibrium prices
exist for every economy. The following theorem is essentially due to Debreu
(1970).
2Debreu (1970).
8Debreu’s Theorem The set of regular economies is generic.
Proof Let us ﬁrst see that dim[Dˆ ze1(p,  e)] = L − 1. For any commodity
1 ≤  <L ,consider the inﬁnitesimal variation in endowments δ
1
  deﬁned by
decreasing e1
l by 1 unit, increasing e1
L by (pl/pL) units and leaving all other
endowments unchanged. Evidently, the income and demand of individual
1 is unaﬀected by the perturbation δ
1




1; the excess demand of individual 1 for all commodities other than l or
the numéraire, as well as the excess demand of every other individual, are
unaﬀected by the perturbation. It follows that ∂ˆ z /∂δ
1
  =1and ∂ˆ zk/∂δ
1
  =0
for all k 6=  ,L. As a consequence, dim[Dˆ z(p,  e)] = L − 1 or, equivalently,
ˆ z t 0. By the transversal density theorem 3, there exists a set of full Lebesgue
measure of regular economies E0 ⊂ E such that, ˆ z  e t 0 whenever   e ∈ E0.
Finally we show that E0 is open. If not, then there is a sequence of non-
regular economies (sometimes called critical)   e(n) converging to a regular
economy   e ∈ E0. Each economy   e(n) has a non-regular (critical) equilib-
rium (p(n),  x(n)). Any convergent sequence {  e(n)} together with its limit   e
is a compact set, hence by the argument given just before the theorem, the
set of all corresponding equilibria must be compact. Hence there is a conver-
gent subsequence (p(nk),  x(nk)) which must converge to a critical equilibrium
(p,  x) of   e, since   e(nk) →   e and any limit of critical equilibria is a critical
equilibrium of the limiting economy. B u tt h a ti si m p o s s i b l es i n c e  e is regular
and therefore has no critical equilibrium. This contradiction proves E0 is
open. ¥
At a Walrasian equilibrium, the proﬁle of marginal utilities of revenue,
  μ =( μ1,...,μ i,...,μ I), is determined by μi =( ∂ui/∂xi
L)(xi).
Using these marginal utilities of income we can deﬁne equilibrium for an
economy   e as a triple (  x,  μ,p) satisfying the equations F  e(  x,  μ,p)=0where









F  e(  x,  μ,p)=
⎛




p · (xi − ei)
. . . P
i(ˆ xi − ˆ ei)
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
,
3Abraham and Robin (1967, thm. 19.1)
9It can be shown that ˆ z  e t 0 if and only if F  e t 0.
3.1 Trade at equilibrium




Lemma 1 Suppose we restrict attention to heterogenous economies with I ≥
2, and L ≥ 2. Then, generically, at every Walrasian equilibrium, every indi-
vidual trades every commodity.
Proof Fix an individual h ∈ I and a commodity k ∈ L; by renumbering
commodities we can take k 6= L, and by renumbering individuals we can take
h 6=1 .
By deﬁnition, the truncated individual excess demand function consists
of the excess demand for the (L−1) commodities other than the numéraire,













k (p,  e)=
µ





The Jacobian matrix De1ˆ z(p,  e) has rank L−1, (as we saw in the proof of
Debreu’s theorem), while De1ˆ zh
k(p,  e)=0 , since h 6=1 . But by exactly that
same argument in Debreu’s theorem, there is an inﬁnitesimal variation, δ
h
k in
the endowments of agent h such that Dδh
kˆ zh












has rank L. Since all the columns of this matrix are linear combinations of
columns of the matrix D  eFh
k , this Jacobian matrix, evaluated at any point
(p,  e) with ˆ z(p,  e)=0 , has rank L, and, as a consequence, Fh
k t 0.
By the transversal density theorem and the boundary behavior of the
excess demand function, there is an open set Eh
k ⊂ E of endowments of full
Lebesgue measure such that for allocations of endowments,   e ∈ Eh
k, (Fh
k )  e t 0.
But (Fh
k )  e t 0 only if (Fh
k )
−1
  e (0) = ∅, since the domain of (Fh
k )  e has dimension
L − 1, while the range has dimension L.
10For   e ∈ Eh
k, there are no prices of commodities such that markets clear,
ˆ z(p,  e)=0 , while individual h does not trade in commodity k, zh
k(p,  e)=0 .
The set of economies E1 = ∩h ∩k Eh
k has the desired property: for any
allocation of endowments   e ∈ E1, at every Walrasian equilibrium, every indi-
vidual trades every commodity. ¥
Since the set of regular economies, E0, is open and of full Lebesgue mea-
sure, the set
E
∗ = E0 ∩ E1
of regular economies with the property that, at every Walrasian equilibrium,
every individual trades every every commodity, is open and of full Lebesgue
measure.
We will restrict attention to this generic set E∗ of regular economies with
full trade.
4 Taxes and transfers
Now we return to the case where there are taxes, but we retain our hypothesis
that there are no external eﬀects: for every individual, the utility function,
ui, is independent of the complementary allocation, x−i. Hence we think of
utility as ﬁxed exactly as in the Walrasian case as a function u∗i : RL
+ → R.
Recall that individuals are taxed tl for purchasing a unit of commodity l;
the tax tl is a mark-up or a subsidy to a buyer of the commodity, but it leaves
a seller unaﬀected. Fiscal revenue is returned to individuals in equal amounts,
τ. Thus taxes and transfers are anonymous. Also, every individual regards
the transfer of revenue that he receives as independent of the commodity
t a x e sh ep a y s .






s.t( p + t) · (xi − ei)+ − p · (xi − ei)− ≤ τ.
The solution xi(p,t,τ,ei), to the optimization problem, deﬁnes the de-
mand correspondence of the individual. The budget set is kinked at the
endowment point, and when there is a subsidy instead of a tax, so some
tl < 0, the budget set is not even convex. Thus in general we cannot be sure
11that xi(p,t,τ,ei) is diﬀerentiable, or even single-valued. But in fact it is, for
small taxes and prices at which there is trade in every commodity.
S u p p o s et h a ta tp r i c e sp∗, and taxes t =0 , and revenue τ =0 , the
individual trades every commodity; that is, suppose his Walrasian demand
at p∗ diﬀers from his endowment, xi
l(p∗,e i) 6= ei
l for all   ∈ L. For any tax










l(p∗,e i) >e i
l
0 if xi
l(p∗,e i) <e i
l
Since the utility function is strictly quasi-concave, it follows that for all
p near enough to p∗,a n dt near enough to 0,a n dτ near enough to 0,t h e




i):( p + t) · (x
i − e










The reason is that the non-overlapping parts of the budget sets contain only
points x for which u∗i(x) <u ∗i(xi(p∗,e i)) by a big gap, and hence are ir-
relevant to the maximization problem, as long as commodity taxes, t, and
transfers, τ,are close enough to 0, and p is near to p∗.T h ea d v a n t a g eo ft h e
second budget set is that it is linear in xi, and hence behaves like a Walrasian
budget set. Furthermore, for ﬁxed p∗,t i
l(p∗,t) is obviously a smooth function
of t.
Since the Walrasian demand function, xi(p,ei), is smooth in (p,ei),t h ed e -
mand function with commodity taxes and transfers of revenue, xi(p,t,τ,ei),
is smooth for p near enough to p∗ and t and τi small enough; in particular it
is smooth at (p,t,τ)=( p∗,0,0).
Recall that in a competitive t-equilibrium, the ﬁscal authority must cal-
culate the ﬁscal revenue that must be redistributed. The tax rebate itself
aﬀects spending across commodities and, consequently, ﬁscal revenue. The
ﬁscal authority must foresee the change in spending and announce anonymous
lump-sum transfers that coincide with the ﬁscal revenue that will ensue. So it
is not obvious that a competitive t-equilibrium exists. The following Lemma
shows that in an economy with a regular Walrasian equilibrium with full
trade, tax equilibrium also exists for small enough taxes.
Lemma 2 Let   e be a regular Walrasian economy (with no externalities). If
(  x∗,  μ
∗,p ∗) is a regular Walrasian equilibrium with full trade, then there exists
12an open set, U ⊂ RL, with 0 ∈ U, a n ds m o o t hf u n c t i o n s˜ xi : U → RL
++,
˜ p : U → R
L−1
++ , and ˜ τ : U → R, such that, (˜ x(0), ˜ p(0),˜ τ(0)) = (  x∗,p ∗,0) and





i t · (˜ xi(t) − ei)+,
˜ xi(t)=xi(p(t),t,˜ τ(t),e i).
Proof The ﬁrst order, market clearing, and ﬁscal balance conditions















++ × R × R
L → R
are deﬁned by
F  e(  x,  μ,p,τ,t)=
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
. . .
Du∗i(xi) − μi(p + ti(p∗,t))
(p + ti(p∗,t)) · (xi − ei) − τ
. . . P
i(ˆ xi − ˆ ei)
⎞














By hypothesis there is full trade, xi
l(p∗,e i) 6= ei
l for all i, , and, as a conse-
quence, ti is a smooth function of t. It follows that F  e is smooth. Furthermore,
for xi near x∗i,t i(p∗,t)) · (xi − ei)=t · (xi − ei)+
Clearly F  e(  x∗,  μ
∗,p ∗,0,0) = 0, since with t =0and τ =0 , the function
F  e simply recapitulates the standard Walrasian equilibrium conditions. Sim-
ilarly, a solution (  x,  μ,p,τ) to F  e(  x,  μ,p,τ,t)=0and to R  e(  x,  μ,p,τ,t)=0
is a competitive t-equilibrium, if t is small enough. The endogenous Wal-




++ . At the regular Walrasian
equilibrium (  x∗,  μ
∗,p ∗),




is, by the deﬁnition of regularity, a square matrix with full rank, (L +1 ) I +
L − 1. When tax rates are zero, changing consumption or marginal utilities
or prices does not aﬀect tax revenue, hence
DηR  e(  x
∗,  μ
∗,p




13It follows that the Jacobian matrix
µ
DηF  e(  x∗,  μ
∗,p ∗,0,0) DτF  e(  x∗,  μ
∗,p ∗,0,0)
DηR  e(  x∗,  μ









has full rank, (L +1 ) I +( L − 1) + 1.
Using (η,τ) as endogenous variables and t as exogenous variables, the im-
plicit function theorem guarantees the existence of competitive t-equilibrium
in a neighborhood of t =0 , as a function of the tax rates on commodities. ¥
We are now ready to establish the crucial step in our proof. When there
are no externalities, taxes help some people and hurt others. But with ex-
ternalities, a tax can change the choices of some individual h,a n dt h e r e b y
improve the utility of another individual i. We ﬁrst establish that by changing
taxes, the ﬁscal authority can produce a rich array of changes in consumption
choices. Those changes will later be used to eﬀect beneﬁcial externalities.
We will not impose taxes on the last, numeraire, commodity: tL =0 .
Thus we conﬁne attention to inﬁnitesimal tax rates dt =( dt1,...,dt L−1).
The reason is that, in general, taxation of all the commodities, including
the numéraire commodity, may not achieve anything more than taxing just
the ﬁrst L−1 commodities. That is the reason we needed to assume L>I.
Corollary 1 At a regular Walrasian equilibrium with full trade, the matrix
Dt  ˜ x =
⎛

































⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
has full column rank, L − 1.
14Proof If not, there would exist dt 6=0 , such that
d˜ x
i = Dt˜ x
idt =0 , for all i.
If consumption does not change, and pL is ﬁxed at 1,a n dtL is ﬁxed at 0,
it follows from the ﬁrst-order conditions for each individual for commodity
l = L that μi does not change either: dμi = Dtμidt =0 . From the ﬁrst
coordinates of the function F  e, it follows, then, that for any commodity,
l 6= L, for which some individual i is a buyer, that dpl+dti
  = Dtpldt+dtl =0 .
Similarly, for any commodity, l 6= L, for which some individual j is a seller,
it follows that dpl = Dtpldt =0 . Since every commodity has both a buyer
and a seller, dtl =0for all l 6= L, i.e. dt =0 , a contradiction. ¥.
I nt h en e x tC o r o l l a r y ,w es h o wt h a tf o ra n yc o m m o d i t y  6= L and any
agent i we could imagine externalities on i such that increasing the tax on
good   would lead to changes in consumption by agents h 6= i that would help
agent i, while changes in any other tax would generate no external eﬀects on
i’s utility.
Corollary 2 At a regular Walrasian equilibrium with full trade, for every
individual, i, and every commodity l 6= L, there exist real numbers λ
i
h,k, for






















=0 ,m 6= l,L.
Proof From the last corollary, the matrix Dt  ˜ x has rank L−1. But
P
i Dt˜ xi
=0 . It follows that if all the rows corresponding to any individual were
removed, the resulting sub-matrix M−i would also have rank L − 1.
The matrix M−i has full column rank if and only if, for each column M
−i
  ,
there is a vector, λ
i








other column m 6= l. ¥
5 Separable Externalities
Externalities are separable if the consumption of others, x−i, does not aﬀect
the marginal utility of an individual’s own consumption.

















where u∗i is the private utility function of the individual deﬁned over his own
consumption, xi, while the vector λ
i =( ...,λ
i
h,l,...),h6= i, is the vector of
external eﬀects on i.
If λ
i
h,l > 0, the consumption of commodity l by individual h has a positive
external eﬀect on individual i; if λ
i
h,l < 0, the external eﬀect is negative; if
λ
i
h,l =0 , t h e r ei sn oe x t e r n a le ﬀect.




An economy with separable externalties is described by the vector (  u∗,  e,
  λ). The private utility functions   u∗ of individuals will be held ﬁxed as in
previous Sections. (We assume the utilities satisfy the same smoothness
conditions 1-2 deﬁned in Section 2). Economies are then indexed by (  e,  λ),
the allocation of endowments and the proﬁle of external eﬀects, and the set
of economies is RLI
++ ×RL(I−1)I, an open set in Euclidean space of dimension
IL+ IL(I − 1).
With separable externalities, there is an economy without external eﬀects
associated unambiguously with an economy with externalities; it obtains by
setting   λ =0 .
Competitive t-equilibria in the externalities economy (  u∗,  e,  λ) coincide
with competitive t-equilibria for the associated economy (  u∗,  e) without the
external eﬀects because the separable externalities do not aﬀect the choices of
individuals. Hence the deﬁnition of regular economy and regular equilibrium
need not change.
Lemma 3 At a regular competitive equilibrium with full trade (but without
commodity taxes), the inﬁnitesimal change in the utility of each individual
due to an inﬁnitesimal change in taxes is smooth and
du
i = Dtu










iDt˜ τ + λ
iDt˜ x
−i)dt.
Proof This is a simple extension of Roy’s identity. The ﬁrst term is the
eﬀect of the induced change in prices on wealth, multiplied by the marginal
utility of revenue; the second and third terms are the direct eﬀect of the
change in taxes on wealth, multiplied by the marginal utility of wealth; the
16last term is the external eﬀect caused by the induced change in consump-
tion of individuals h 6= i. B yt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m ,t h ec h a n g e si nu t i l i t y
caused via the reoptimization of own consumption, xi, and the change in the
marginal utility of revenue, μi, are of second order and can be dropped. ¥
5.1 Pareto improving taxes
When there are no externalities, it can be shown that after normalizing util-
ities properly, no tax package can raise the sum of utilities. We now show
that with separable externalities, generically, every competitive equilibrium
can be Pareto improved upon by commodity taxes and anonymous trans-
fers. A key step in the proof is to show that for generic endowments and
externalities, no matter what weights π =( π1,...,πI) ∈ SI−1 are used on the
utilities, there will be some tax package that does increase the π-weighted
sum of utilities.
Proposition 1 In the class of smooth economies with separable externalities
and I<L , generically, every competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved
by anonymous commodity taxes and transfers.
Proof We saw in Lemma 1 that for ﬁx e ds m o o t hu t i l i t i e s  u∗, there is
a generic set E∗ of allocations of endowments such that every Walrasian
economy with   e ∈ E∗ is regular, and every Walrasian equilibrium of   e has
full trade (every individual trades every commodity). In fact the argument
we gave after Debreu’s theorem shows that the set
M = {(  x,  μ,p,  e):(   x,  μ,p) is a Walrasian equilibrium
for the economy   e ∈ E
∗}







G(  x,  μ,p,  e,  λ,π)=πDt  u =
P
i πiDtui,
where Dt  u =( Dtu1,...,D tui,...,D tuI) is a matrix of dimensions I×(L−1),
and π =( π1,...,πi,...πI) is an element of the sphere of dimension I − 1.
17G denotes the change in the π-weighted sum of utilities that can be wrought
with each tax, taking into account all the changes in consumption caused by
the tax and the re-equilibration of prices.
A c c o r d i n gt oC o r o l l a r y2a n dL e m m a3 ,b ya p p r o p r i a t e l yp e r t u r b i n gλ,
one can perturb each entry duh/dtk, leaving dui/dtl =0 , for all i 6= h and/or
l 6= k. Since some πi 6=0 ,D λG has full row rank L − 1. Hence G t 0.
It follows that G−1(0) is a manifold of dimension IL+ IL(I − 1) + (I −







(  x,  μ,p,  e,  λ) →proj (  e,  λ).
By Sard’s theorem,4 the set Λ of regular values of the projection has full
measure in E∗ × RIL(I−1). Since   λ does not aﬀect equilibrium, we can argue
exactly as in Debreu’s theorem that the set Λ of regular values is open. In
other words, Λ is generic. Since the domain of the projection has a lower di-
mension than the range, an economy, (  e,  λ) is a regular value of the projection
if and only if it is not in the image of the projection, i.e. (  e,  λ) 6∈ G−1(0).
Thus for any economy in the generic set Λ, at every one of its Walrasian
equilibria, there is no solution to the system of equations πDt  u =0 ;e q u i v -
alently, the matrix Dt  u has full row rank, I. Thus there is an inﬁnitesimal
tax package dt with Dt  udt >> 0. It follows that every Walrasian equilibrium
can be Pareto improved upon by some commodity tax package, dt (and the
associated anonymous transfer of revenue). ¥
6E x a m p l e
Individuals are i =1 ,2, and commodities are l =1 ,2,3.
























































4Abraham and Robin (1967, thm. 5.1)
18is the private utility function over own consumption.
Externalities are separable.
The endowments of individuals are
e
1 =( 1 ,0,e
1
3) and e
2 =( 0 ,1,e
2
3),
respectively, with the endowment in commodity l =3suﬃciently large.
Prices of commodities are p =( p1,p 2,1), and tax rates on commodities
are t =( t1,t 2,0); commodity l =3is numéraire and not subject to taxation.
Assuming external eﬀects that are separable from the marginal utility of
each individual’s own consumption allows for competitive equilibrium prices
and allocations, with or without taxes, that are independent of the coeﬃ-
cients of external eﬀects.
The quasi-linearity of the utility functions in the numéraire commodity
eliminates income eﬀects and facilitates computations.






























































The derivative of utilities with respect to taxes at the point of zero taxes


































































































By the envelope theorem and the fact that the marginal utility of consump-
























































By symmetry the other welfare eﬀects can be immediately deduced to be:











































































In the absence of external eﬀects, for   λ =0 , the matrix Dt  u is singular,
in particular Dtu1 +Dtu2 =0 , and Pareto improving taxes do not exist; the
Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
20Pareto improving taxes dt, that solve (Dt  u)dt À 0, exist if the matrix
Dt  u has full row rank.




are all non-zero (in fact, all positive), it is
clear that by perturbing the variables λ
i
−i,l one can perturb the matrix in any
way desired. Thus the matrix Dt  u is invertible for almost all choices of the
externality variables λ
i
−i,l. Since a regular economy   e has a ﬁnite number of
equilibria, almost all choices λ
i
−i,l will simultaneously make all the equilibrium
welfare eﬀect matrices Dt  u invertible.
21Notation
• 0 is the transpose.
• Av e c t o ra =( ...,a k,...), is non-negative: a ≥ 0, if ak ≥ 0, for every
k; it is positive: a>0, if ak ≥ 0, for every k, with strict inequality,
ak > 0, for some; it is strictly positive: a À 0, if ak > 0, for every k;
analogously, the vector a is non-positive: a ≤ 0, negative: a<0, and
strictly negative: a ¿ 0. For vectors a and b, a ≥ b if (a − b) ≥ 0,
a>bif (a−b) > 0, and a À b if (a−b) À 0; analogously, (a−b) ≤ 0,
(a − b) < 0, and (a − b) ¿ 0.
• For a, ar e a ln u m b e r ,a+ =m a x {a,0}, and a− = −min{a,0}; for
a =( ...,a k,...), vector, a+ =( ...,a k+,...), and a− =( ...,a k−,...).
• Rk is Euclidean space of dimension k – for simplicity, one writes R
for R1; the non-negative orthant is Rk
+, and its interior, the strictly
positive orthant, is Rk
++.
•S k is the sphere of dimension k; its intersection with the non-negative
orthant is Sk
+, and with the strictly positive orthant Sk
++.
• []is the span of a collection of vectors or the column span of a matrix.
• If g is a function of (...,y k,...), then “gyk ” is the function deﬁned by
gyk(...,y k−1,y k+1,...)=g(...,y k−1,y k,y k+1,...).
• Dyg is the gradient of a function, g, with respect to y – for simplicity,





if g =( ...,g l,...)0, then












is the Jacobean matrix.
22• D2
yg is the Hessian matrix of second derivatives of a function, g, with
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